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Monetary Growth and the Timing of
Interest Rate Movements
W. W. BROWN and G. J. SANTONI
T IS widely believed that market interest rates fol-
low aparticular time path in responseto changes in the
rate of monetary growth. This time path is important
because interest rates are thought to be one of the
conduits of monetary policy.
In particular, an unanticipated but permanent in-
crease in the monetary growth rate will presumbly
lower market interest rates, temporarily resulting in a
reshuffling of resources among competing uses. As a
consequence, an economy characterized by slack will
be pushed to a permanently higher le~ el ofaggregate
demand, employment, output and, eventually, higher
market interest rates as a result of the monetary
stimulus.
The length of the time path followed by interest
rates reveals information concerning the lag in mone-
tary policy’s effect. Curiosity about this provided
the initial motivation for earlier empirical investiga-
tions.’ This paper discusses the theoretical argument
and examinessome evidence regarding the response of
interest rates to changes in monetary growth.
W. W. Brown is an associate professor ofeconomics at California
State University, Northridge.
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THE THEORY
Equation 1 breaks the nominal interest rate, i, into
its two components: the cx ante real interest rate, r,
and the expected rate of inflation, P~.
(1) i = r+P~
The waxing and waning of the effects of a change in
monetary growth on each of these components gener-
ates the time path followed by the nominal rate. An
unanticipated change in monetary growth initially
affects the cx ante realrate ofinterest; this is calledthe
“liquidity effect.”2 The permanent changein monetary
growth, once it is known, affects the expected rate of
inflation and is called the “Fisher effect.”
The Liquidity Effect
The theoretical argument concerning the liquidity
effect typically runs as follows: an unanticipated in-
crease in the monetary growth rate results initially in
an excess supply in the money market at the existing
nominal rate ofinterest. Part ofthis excess shows up as
an increase in thedemand for securities. The prices of
securities are bid up, and nominal yields decline until
the market clears.3
2
Traditionally, the term “liquidity effect’ was used to describe the
impactofan unanticipated change inthe stock ofmoney on interest
rates. More recently, however, the term has been applied to the
initial effect on interest rates of an unanticipated change in the
stock ofmoney induced by an unanticipated change in the mone-
tary growth rate. We have adopted the more recent usage of the
term in this paper. Milton Friedman, “Factors Affectingthe Level
ofInterest Rates,“Money Supply, MoneyDenuind, and Macroeco-
nomic Models, J. T. Boorman and T. M. Havrilesky, eds. (AIlyn
and Bacon, Inc., 1972), pp. 205—06.
‘See, for example, Cagan, The Channels ofMonetary Effects. Note,
particularly, that “the first round effects of money creation are
ignored (p. 85)
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Coincident with the downward movement ofnomi-
nal yields in the loanable funds marketis a reduction in
the cx ante real rate of interest in the goods market.
The result is that investment demand is stimulatedand
saving out ofcurrent income is reduced. The conten-
tion isthat realinvestment andconsumption rise, stim-
ulating ceonomnic activity. The excess demand for real
present resources that follows from this decline in the
cx ante real rate is made up by “the flow of funds
supplied out of the discrepancy between actual and
desired money balances
After a sufficient time, the excess supply in the
money market is eliminated by an expansion in nomi-
nal income. This expansion raises the demand for
money, reverses the liquidity effectand returns the cx
ante real interest rate to its original level.
The Fisher Effect
A permanent increase in the monetary growth rate
will result in a permanently higher rate of inflation,
ceteris parihus. Sincelending contracts typically spec-
ify fixed nominal payment streams, a higher nominal
rate will be required to compensate lenders for the
increased rate ofdepreciation expected tooccur in the
real value of their receipts. If credit market partici-
pants acquire information regarding the permanently
higher rate ofinflation with a lag, the convergence of
the nominalrate upon a higherlevelwill occurgradual-
ly with a corresponding lag.
F,gore I
Panel A: Time Path of the Et Ante Real Rate
tØt~t
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Panel B: Time Path of Expected Inflation
~
!anel C: Time Path of the Nominal Rate
to
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An Illustration of the Time Path
Figure 1 depicts hypothesized time paths of the cx
ante realrateofinterest, r (panel A), the expected rate
of inflation, P0 (panel B), and the nominal rate of in-
terest, i (panel C), that result froman unanticipated and
pernianent increase in the monetary growth rate be-
ginning at time to.
Assuming that the expected rate ofinflationand the
price level do not immediately adjust to the change in
monetary growth, the cx ante real rate of interest
moves along a path like abc and remains below its
initial level until time t
3
. The liquidity effect is illus-
trated by the movement from a to b; the expansion
effect is shown by the movement from b to c.
Panel B of figure 1 illustrates the time path of the
expected rate ofinflation. Given the lagin the acquisi-
tion ofinformation concerningthe permanently lngher
4lbid,, p. 87.
rate ofmonetary growth, the expected rate of inflation
is presumed to adjust along a path like kfg.This is the
Fisher effect.
Panel C presents the time path of the nominal in-
terest rate. It is derived by adding the time path ofthe
expected rate ofinflation tothe time path ofthe cxante
realrate ofinterest as suggested by equation ito obtain
the path lmn. Note that the nominal rate reaches a
minimuminperiod t~,which is both higherand occurs
earlier than the minimum of the cx ante real rate.
The pathofthe nominal ratedepends on how swiftly
the expected rate of inflation responds -° It is possible
‘We assume that nominal rates adjust perfectly to changes in ex-
pected inflation as suggested by Fisher’s theory. l”or further dis-
cussion ofthis issue, see John A. Carlson, “Short-Term Interest
Rates as Predictors of Inflation: Comment,” American Economic
Review (June 1977), pp. 469—75; JanWalter Elliot, “Measmsringthe
Expected Real Rate ofInterest: An Exploration ofMacroeconomic
Alternatives,” American Economic Review (June 1977), pp. 429—
44; Eugene F. Fama, “Short-Term Interest Ratesas Predictors of
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that the nominalrate will fail to decline in response to
an increase in the monetary growth rate even though
the cxante real rate does. In the extreme, if expecta-
tions and the price level were to adjust perfectly and
instantaneously to the permanent increase in mone-
tary growth at to, there would be no liquidity effect. An
excess supply ofmoney, whichis a preconditionfor the
operation of a liquidity effect, would not exist. The
expected rate of inflation and the nominal rate would
move along the paths khg and lqn, respectively.
AN ECONOMIC CONSTRAINT ON THE
TIME PATH
Theory provides little guidance in identifying the
actualtime paths that are followed by the nominal and
cx ante real interest rates. This can only be resolved
empirically. The time paths that interest rates follow
when adjusting to a changein monetary growth will be
constrained, however, by the wealth-maximizing be-
havior of individuals. The time paths must he such
that they cannot be predicted (cx ante) by market
participants.
Efficient Markets and the Response ofthe
Nominal Rate
On an intuitive level, a systematic and predictable
relationship between the nominal interest rate and
changes in the monetary growth ratethat are known to
bepermanent (like that shown by the pathlmn in panel
C offigure 1) may imply that profitable trading oppor-
tunities are left unexploited by financial market par-
ticipants.6 If transaction costs are low relative to the
predicted change in the value of the security traded,
selling, and selling short at t0, will result in trading
profits. Naturally, such trading would tend to elimi-
natethe lagin the adjustmentofnominal interest rates,
causing the time path to move toward one like lqn.’
The acquisition of new information, of course, is
costly and these costs may increase with the rate of
acquisition. Under these circumstances, interest rates
will adjust to changes in monetary growth with a lag.
The length of the lag will depend upon the relative
costs and benefits of acquiring information more
rapidly.
Efficient Markets and the
Path of the Real Rate
Since the cx ante real rate of interest reflects the
valueofpresent consumption (short-lived, nondurable
goods) relative to future consumption (long-lived, du-
rablegoods), the liquidity effect implies aspecific time
path of the relative prices of long- in terms of short-
lived goods. In particular, the time path of the cxante
realrate in panel Ao ffigure 1 suggests that the prices
of more durable goods (long-lived assets) rise relative
to less durable goods (short-lived assets) fronn to to t
2
,





Ourprevious comments regarding the limits toprof-
itablebond tradingapply aswell tothe predictability of
this U-shaped pattern in the prices of long- and short-
lived assets. That is, predictable U-shaped swings in
the relative prices ofvarious assets (as implied by the
timepattern ofthe realrate shown in panel A of figure
1) may indicate that profitable trading is possible in
ceedings (May 1970), pp. 383—417; and Frederic S. Mishkiu, A
Rationa/ Expectations Approach to Macroecono,netric.s (National
Bureau ofEconomic Research, 1983),
8
As anexample, see Milton Friedman’s discussion. Hereasons that
“from a longer-term vie,v, the newbalance sheet (of thepublic) is
out of equilibrium, with cash being temporarily high relative to
other assets. Holders ofcash will seek to purchase assets to achieve
a desired structure. This willbid up theprice ofassets These
effects can he described as operating on ‘interest rates,’ if a more
cosmopolitan interpretation of‘interest rates’ is adopted than the
mssual one which refers to a small range ofmarketable securities.
0
Thispoint was discussed by Fisher in 1896. “Ifgold appreciates in
such a way or in such a sense that he (tIme ordinary man) expectsa
shrinking margin of profit, he will he cautious about borrowing
unless interest falls; and this very unwillingness to borrow, lessen-
ing the demand in the ‘money market willbring interest down.”
Further, “every chance for gain iseagerly watched. An active and
intelligent speculation isconstantly going oil, which .. .perftrms
a well-known and provident social function for society. Is itreason-
able to believe that foresight, which is the general rule, has an
exception when applied to falling or rising prices?’ Irving Fisher,
“Appreciation and Interest,” Publications of the American Eco-
nomicAssociation (August 1906), pp. 36—37.
‘Eugene F. Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory’
and Empirical Work,” The Journal of Finance, Papers and Pro-
“Thekey feature ofthis process isthat it tendsto raise theprices
ofsources ofboth producer arid comssumerservices relative to the
prices ofthe services themselves. .. .Ittherefire encouragesthe
production ofsuchsources (this isthestimulus to ‘investment’ ..
and, at the same time, thedirect acquisition ofservices rather than
of the source (this is the stimulmms to ‘consumption’ relative to
‘savings’). lInt these reactions in their turn tend to raise theprices
of services relative to the prices of sources, this is, to undo the
initial effects [our emphasis] on interest rates.
“Ofcourse, all these forces operate simu/taneous/y [our empha-
sis] and there are ebbs amid Ilowsand not merely movement in one
direction.” Milton Friedman, “The Lag in Effect of Monetary
Policy,’ in Milton Friedman, ed,, The Optimum Quantity of
Money and Other Essays (Aldimie Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 255—
56.
18FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1983
these markets. As in financial markets, however, such
trading will tend to limit these changes in relative
prices to magnitudes that essentially reflect the cost of
transacting.°In short, the time paths of both real and
nominal interest rates will be constrained by the exist-
ence ofefficient financial and capital markets. 10
SEARCHING FOR A VALIIJ TEST
FERIOI)
The conditions that must exist to generate a time
path of interest rates like that shown in panel C of
figure 1 arenottrivial. Since the time path presumably
is generated by a monetary policy shock, the institu-
tional environment must he one that allows these
shocks to occur. In particular, the operation ofa Fisher
effect will be especially sensitive to the implications
the existing monetary institutions have for the ex-
pected duration of changes in the monetary growth
rate and the possibility that these changes can be in-
duced by the fiat of the monetary authority. In short,
the institutions must he such that exogenously deter-
mined changes in the monetary growth rate are possi-
ble. In addition, since the liquidity effect depends
upon monetary changes being unanticipated, it will
operate only during periods in which the mnonetary
authority can cause unpredictable changes in mnoney
growth.” A precondition of this is that changes in
money growth are unrelated to prior movements in
other economic variables, particularly, interest rates.
°SeeFrank H. Knight, “Unemployment: And Mr. Keynes Revolu-
tion in Economic iheory,” Canadian Journal of Economies and
Political Science (1937), pp. 112—13; Frank 11. Knight, “Capital,
l’ime and the Interest Rate,” Economica (August 1934), pp. 257—
86; Lloyd W. Mints, Monetary Policy for a Competitice Society
(McGraw-Hill, 1950), pp. 58—70: Gustav Cassel, “The Rate of
Interest, the Bank Rate, and tIme Stabilization of Prices,” in Read-
ings’ in Monetary Theory ~The Blakiston Company, 1951). pp.
319—33; and Frank H. Knight, The Ethics ofCompetition (Books for
Libraries Press, 1969), pp. 273—74.
‘°lfthe changes in relative prices that are described in footnote 8
always followthesame time sequence, it ispossible that profitable
trades are left unexploited. On the other hand, if”allthese forces
operate simultaneously,’ the possibility of wealth increasingex-
change is eliminated hut so isthe timepath ofthe cx ante realrate.
As it stands, the argument appears to be amhiguous concerning
the time path followed by the cx ante real interest rate.
ItFrederic S. Mishkin, “Monetary Policy and Long-Term Interest
Rates: An Efficient Markets Approach,” Journal of Monetary
Economics (Janmmary 1981), pp. 29—55; Frederic S. Mishkin,
“Monetary Policy and Short-term Interest Rates: An Efficient
Markets-Rational Expectations Approach,” The Journal of Fi-
nance (March 1982), pp. 63—72; David A. Pierce, “Relationships
— and the LackThereof— Between EconomicTime Series, with
Special Reference to Money arid Interest Rates,” Journal of the
American Statistical Association (March 1977), pp. 11—22.
Unfortunately, data concerning anticipated and un-
anticipated money growth are not directly observable,
and we know of no satisfactory method of empirically
separating actual money growth into these two compo-
nents. In addition, it is notgenerally possible todirect-
ly observe the cx ante real interest rate. For these
reasons, theliquidity effect tends tobe confounded by
the Fisher effect in empirical tests. However, since
one of our main purposes is to discover the lag in the
effectofmonetary policy as implied by the time path of
nominal interest rates, this is not particularly trouble-
some.
In the following, we examine various historical
periods during which different monetary institutions
prevailed. Our purpose is to discover a period that will
yield a valid test ofthe hypothesis concerning the time
path.
The Gold Standard Period.: 1900_2912
The Cold Standard Act became law in March of1900
and remained in force until January of1934 when it was
superseded by the Cold Reserve Act. During this
period, the price ofgold was fixed at $20.67 per ounce
and, equallyimportant, goldcirculated as a medium of
exchange. Maintenance of this type of gold standard
imnposes binding constraints on the monetary author-
ities that prevent them from generating significant and
long-lived changes in money growth (in the absence of
new golddiscoveries or improvements in mnining tech-
nology). “The stock of money must be whatever is
necessary to balance international payments.”3
Hence, any changein the growth rate ofmoney that, if
maintained, would cause the future supply ofmoney to
deviate from that necessary to maintain the balance of
payments and the fixed exchange rate between the
dollar amid goldmust eventuallybe offset by a changein
the opposite direction.
During this period, individuals holding mnonetary
assets, in large part, were insulated fi’om changes in
the real value oftheir assets. Under the goldstandard,
any unanticipated change in the general level ofprices
produced by temporary changes in the quantity of
money “was likely to reverse or ‘correct’ itself, i.e.,
12Th avoid the confounding effects ofthe depression years, we have
omitted them from our analysis.
‘
3
Milton Friedman mid Anna Schwartz, A Monetary Ilistormj ofthe
United States 1867—1960 (Princeton University Press, 1963), p.
191.
19FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1983
‘average out’ over time.”4 Friedman and Schwartz
note that “. ..the gold standard ruled supreme when
the act (the Federal Reserve Act) was passed, and its
continued supremacy was taken for ~
Consequently, since changes in monetary growth
werearguablyviewedas temporary during this period,
we would not expect to observe the Fisher effect.
While the gold standard prevented significant and
long-livedchanges in mnoney growth, it didnot prevent
the occurrence ofshort-term swingsin the growth rate.
The coefficient ofvariation in theannual growth rateof
money is 87 percent during the 1914—29 period. In
contrast, during the 1970—82 period, which has been
characterized as a period of highly volatile money
growth, the coefficient of variatiomi is 20 percent.
Since the liquidity effect is a short-term phe-
nomenon predicated on unanticipated changes in the
monetary growth rate (whether permanent or tempo-
rary), this period would seem to be particularly
appropriate in testing for its presence because the
Fisher effect is arguably zero. Temporary changes in
the growth rate of money did not induce confounding
impacts on the nominal rate. Roughly, movememits in
nominal rates should mirror movements in real rates
duringthe goldstandard.’6 Ifmoney is exogenous with
‘
4
Benjamnin Klein, “Our New Monetary Standard: The Measure-
ment and Effects of Price Umicertainty,” Economic Inquiry (De-
cember 1975), p. 471; see, as well, I. B. Ibrahim and Raburn M.
Williams, “The Fisher Relationship Under Different Monetary
Standards,”Journal ofMoney, Credit and Banking(August 1978),
pp. 363—70. In addition, the major discoveries of gold had oc-
curred prior to 1900 and the cyanide process was successfully





Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, p. 191.
moone mightquestion whether changes in the nominal rate tracked
changes in the real rate ofinterest during this period. To check
this, we regressed annual changes in the yield of high grade
corporate bonds (Standard and Poor’s) on annual changes in the
ratio ofthe Consumer Price Index divided by an index ofstock
prices (Standard and Poor’s)for theperiod 1907—29. Given Klein’s
evidence, changes in the bond yield during this period should
reflect changes in the real interest rate. l’he CPI, of course, is
heavilyweighted in the favor of present consumption goods and
thus represents the average price of current consumption. The
stockpriceindexisanindexoftheprices ofcapital goods. Changes
inthe ratioofthese two prices will trackchanges in therealrate of
interest andbe reflected by changes in the bond yield during the
gold standard period. The results are given below (t-values in
parentheses):
Si .05 ‘3- 16.01S(CPI/5TDP)
(5.97)
112 = .59 OW = 1.81
The results areconsistent with theclaim that changes in bond yields
reflected changes in the real rate ofinterest during this period.
Interestingly, the relationship breaks down completely for the
more recent period, 1954—82. The results for this period are:
respect to interest rates and ifnot all ofthe changes in
monetary growth that occurred were anticipated, then
theestimated relationship for this period shoulddepict
a time path of interest rates similar to that shown in
panel A of figure 1.
The End of the Gold Standard Act
Through the Korean War: 1934—53
From mid-1934 through March of 1953, little varia-
tion occurred in short-term interest rates. For exam-
ple, table 1 lists the level ofthe commercial paper rate
and the number of months during which the rate re-
mained constant at a particular level. The table indi-
catesthat the recordedcommercial paper ratechanged
only four times during the period running from June
1934 through June 1938 and that, during this time, it
remained constant at .75 percent for a period of 26
months. In fact, month-to-month changes in the re-
cordedcommercial paper rate were zero in all but 46 of
the entire 225 months. In contrast, for the period
1954—82, the ratefailed to change in only25 out of348
months.
Since there was little month-to-month variation in
eitherthe commercialpaper rateorother interest rates
during the 1934—53period, and since there is reason to
believe that money was endogenous to interest rates
during this period, we havetreated it separately in the
empirical ~
The Korean War to the Present: 1954~2
Since the end of the Korean War, month-to-month
variation in nominal interest rates has been consider-
able. The Cold Reserve Act, however, continued to tie
thedollar, albeit loosely, to golduntil August 15, 1971.
Consequently, we have split the 1954—82 period at
this point. During the latter period, the behavior of
the monetary authority has -been free of the formal
constraints imposedby gold. Ifarelationship similar to
that shown in panelC offigure 1 exists between money
and interest rates, it should show up during this
period.
Si = .38 + .545(CPIISTDP)
(.98)
= .15 RHO = .33 ow = 1.62
(1.84)
For further evidence, see Robert J. Shiller and Jeremy J. Siegel,
“The Gibson Paradox and Historical Movements in Real Interest
Rates,” Journal of Political Economy (October 1977), p. 905.
m
7
Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, p. 562.
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EMpIRIc-AL ESTIMATION
Using monthly nominal interest rates and money
supply data, we have run regressions for each of the
subperiods 1914—29, 1934—53, 1954—70 and 1971—82.
In each case, the money supply is defined as Ml
halances.ms The interest rate isdefined as the comnmer-
cial paper rate (4—6 month maturityprior toNovember
1979 and 120-day maturity after). In each period, the
monthly change in the interest rate is regressed on
monthly changes in the rate ofmonetary growth in the
contemnporaneous month and 38 past (lagged) monthly
changes.‘°This specification initially was identified as
the unrestricted model. In order to determine
whether the estimated coefficients are sensitive to the
lag length and toidenti~’statistically redundant lags,
the structure was shortened to 24, 18, 12, 6, 3, 1 and
zero months. At each stage, an F—test \%‘as applied to
determine whether the omittedlags were significant.2°
J-u.ly 1914 — December 1929
Table 2 presents the results for the 1914—29 period.
Thetest for lag length revealed a lag structure ofthree
months. Allofthe estimated coefficients are negative,
and three are significantly different fm-om zero. The
sum over the coefficients is significantly negative as
well. These results suggest that a one percentage—point
(100 basis—point) increase in the monetary growth rate
xvouldhaveproduced adecline of abomitone basis point
in the commercial paper rate during this period.’’
Empiric-ally, the estimated efl’eet is surely miniscule
and, as indicated by the F-statistic (2.08), we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the relationship arose ran—
clomnlv. The constant term in the regression is statisti—
calls’ insignificant, which is consistent withthe efficient
\Ii halzumces were eimmplnvcd s iimce Im,’iimsdcr inonetarv aggregates
arc morc likely to he endogeuons with respect to interest rates.
While the Un~t-dStates was on a gold standard prior to 1914.
monthly Mi data are not available before Jtine 1914.
~Fhis lag length was selected as a point of departure and is hased
‘upon carlicr work concerning the time path. See Cagan amid
Candoifi, The Lag in Monetary Policy.”
‘°Tiiistest is sensitive to the initial lag length spccifled in the
0mm ‘c-stricter
1
inmdel, As a consequence. it is possilmie that the test
“ill re jret sonit’ vsu’iahics that are, in fact, significant iftoo long a
lag is specified. To control (or this, ‘ye ran the tests with the lag
Ic-ngth in tile u isrestricted model initiallv set at 38. We then
‘educed the numnher of lags imm the unrestricted momlel to 24 and
‘all the test again. 3iiiswas continued ummtil we exhausted all ofthe
possihilities.
2 For hi rtlmer risenssion megardi1mg this process, see Cagan and
Gandolfi. “The Lag in Monetary Policy,” p. 280.
T Unusual Behavior of the
Commercial Paper Rate.
June 1934 — February 95S -
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RaSmflS Mon*daty Statist , 214—41 pp 442=
t94 pp87 4-
market hvpoth jsis that interest iat changes hax en o
trend.
Further, the results for this period ne consistent
with a long—run Fisher effect of zero. This result was
expected gi~ en the consti tints implied In the gold
standard.
~ppl\ mng a Ci~mges ‘causalit~ - test xs c examined
the data to determine whether changes in the interest
rate arc endogenous to chang S in monetary growth
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Table 2
The Relationship Between Changes in
Money Growth and Changes in Interest






Constant 840 0 29
a, .102 1 24
a. .269 1 93’
a, 379 2 59’
a. 169 1 72’
9 217’
Rho 0.43 54~’
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Adlusteufor first-order aiitocorrelalion
‘Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confiaence
level
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poInt change in the monthly anr.ualizeo rate of change in
tIle money stock
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‘Significantly oifterenm from zero at the 95 percent confluence
level
while changes in monetary growth are exogenous to
changes in the interest rate. Lag lengths of3, 6, 9, 12
and 18 months were used in the test. Our results,
presented in table3, reject the hypothesis that changes
in the monetary growth rate caused changes in the
interest rate during this period.
due to the lack of variation in market rates, rio rela-
tionshipappears toexistbetween changesin the mone-
tary growth rate and interest rates. None of the lags
were significant in the F-tests. As aconsequence, table
4 only reports the regression for the change in mone-
tary growth contemporaneous to time change in the
interest rate. Even in this ease, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the constant and the coefficient of the
change in monetary growth are zero.
The results of the Granger tests indicate that time
money and interest rate series were independent dtmr-
ing the period. Thisheld foreach lag length tmsed inthe
test (see table 3).
fe-n-nary 1954 — December 1970
Our results for the January 1954 — December 1970
Januarq 1934 — December 1953 period are presented in table 5. The lag structure
indicated by the F-test contains 24 mnonths and, as in
Table 4 presents our results for the commercial earlier periods, the constant is insignificant. These
paper rate during the 1934—53 period. As expected, results generally are not consistent with the appear-




Rates January 934 December 1953
EsdmedEquaftot~
- ~ Constant pAM




0 0W 00 0.00
AestetEorfrsster a ritetata --
Sgnibc~S~ dOterent from zero at the 25 ercent ctmtktetice
Note units the fllci~Se asiswlO%serIps
pointchan$fle moottiw annuatizedtots change in
the moneystock
ance of either a contemporaneous or lagged liquidity
effect in norrnnal interest rates. While the first four
coefficients are negative, they are statistically indistin-
guishable from zero.
With the exception of lag 24, the remaining coef-
ficients are all positive and 15 are significant. Their
sum (36.00 basis points) differs significantly from zero,
which is consistent withthe Fisher effect. The upward
adjustment of the interest rate, however, is less than
that implied by the Fisher effect.22
The results ofthe Granger test suggest that changes
in the interest rate are exogenous to changes in the
monetary growth rate, while changes in the monetary
growth rate are endogenous to changes in the interest
rate (see table 3). This result heldup for eachof the lag
lengths employed. It appears that the causality rela-
tionship is one-way, running from interest rates to
money. The theoretical arguments that underpin the
hypothesis regarding the time path, however, are
based on the assumption that money causes interest
rates.
tmm
We have little faith in the results obtained during this period.
Unlike the other periods we consider, the F-test for laglength is
particularly sensitive to the initial lag specification, Beginning
with alag length ofone month and adding lags, the test reveals a
lag ofthreemonths, Onthe other hand, beginning with 38 months
and dropping lags, the test reveals a length of 24 months, This
ambiguity did not surface in anyoftheotherperiods we examined.
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Table 6
The RelationshipBetween Changes in
MoneyGr*wth ~ndChanges in Interest
Rates January 1971 Febwary 1983
Estimated Equatio
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It 25 ~ent confSmce
Note U oS Is ~pe percentage-
potntchange fit monthly sdr$n%ct*noetn
The moos
These results with i cspect to both the incomplete
adjustment of the nomin’il rate and the endogc in of
moncy with respect to interest tatcs can he c plained
bs the operation of the Gold Resers e Act, Othes -
planations at no doubt possihh, In any case thes
mcscal littleabout thc laginthe cffcetofan xogenousls
detcrinined monetars polies - In this sc nsc thc i csults
obtained for this pciiod as fom the earliei periods, are
disappointing
Our restilts for the most reccnt pcriod in which the
dollar has been I galls free from gold ue summ’u izc cl
in table 6, The F-test indicated a lag structum-e of 12
months, As hefire, the constant tenn isnot significant—
lv difh~rentfront zero, More important, the results
are consistent with the existence of a contemporaneous
liquidity effect, The coefficient of the contempo-
raneous change in the monetary growth rate is nega-
tive and significant‘As expected, the liquidity effect is
quite small nuniericallv (2.65 basis points) and short—
lived, 23
The remaining coefficients-are all positive and sig-
nificant, The sum over the coefficients (98.33 basis
points) is significantly different from zem-o and statisti—
callv indistinguishable fi-om 100 (t = .08) as predicted
by the Fisher effect. Fut-ther, the hulk of the adjust-
ment inthe interest rate (61,86hasis points) takes place
within six months.
Chart 1 illustrates the time path ofthe interest rate
that is impliedhv these results, A comparison ofchart I
with figure 1 (panel C) indicates the results obtained
for the mnore recent pet-iod con firm roughly to those
implied b~’rapidly changing inflation expectationss
The Granger test for this period indicates bi-
directional causality. On the whole, the results of the
Granger test suggest that the January 1971—February
1983 periodis the only one ofthose considered that is a
candidate for a valid test ofthe hypothesis regarding
the time path. It is only during this period that we
cannot reject thehypothesis that changes in the mone—
tars’ growth rate caused changes in the interest rate, 2.,
231,1 an effort to highlight the liquiditv efièet that apparentlv 0(1.1irs
in the nouth c-onteinporaiseou s to tbc-change in nsonetarv gmowth -
we m’egressed \-Vednesday—to—Weclnesda changes in the:3-itmnth
l’reassiry bill rate oim thc- weekly c-ban gc- in the growth tate of the
finally revised seasonally adjusted stock (If M 1. The contc-mnponm—
ml eous and th I-ce lags of the monetary variable were included as
independent variables. The data periods were 12/28177—9/26/79
and 10/3/79—10/6/82. The period ‘vas split inthis fashion tocontrol
fbr the Feds announced policy shift in October 1979 and its
subsequent reversal in October 1982. The results were clis—
appo intimlg in that a significant relationship failed to emerge in
either subperiod.
24Earlier workon this question concluded that thelagwas considler—
abl v Ionger than 12 mouths, Sc-c, fbr exainplc- - Cagan and Can —
do
16
, ‘The Lag in Monetary Policy, pp. 277—84.
2
’All ofthe tests were rws again with the com’porate Aaa hood rate
identified as the dc-penclen t variable - ‘1’l~ ree important difierences
Isetwee ii these esul ts and those for the Coin inem’c’ial paper rate
wem’e noted. First, during the gold standard period, thelagwas 38
iuon ths - A statisticall~-significant hut ‘‘er’ small liq tm idlitv effect
(.76 basis points) emerged. The Fisher effl,~c’tagain was zero. The
results (If the Granger test indicate one—wa” causality running
from money to Aaa homsd rates - Second, duringthe January 1954—
Deeeioher I 970 period, tlse lag was zero inomsth s - Neither Iiquidl—
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A widely held view is that changes in the monetary
growth rate operate on the nominal interest rate
through systematically lagged liquidity and Fisher
effects. In particular, increasesin monetary growth are
thought to produce initial declines arid subsequent
increases in the nominal and real rates of interest.
Our results suggest that only the data from the
period since 1971 represent a fruitful basis for testing
this hypothesis. Before then, the money and interest
ity or Fisher effects were apparent in the data, The Granger test
indicatesthat moneyand Aaabond rates were independent series,
Third, dnring theJanuary 1971 Febrnary 1983 period, the lagis
12 months (consistent with that of the commercial paper rate),
However, the data reject the appearance ofa hqnidity effect in
nominal interest rates, None of the estimated coefficients are
negative. Eleven coefficients are significantly positive but they
.‘sum to less than 100 basis points. The Granger test indicates
bidirectional cansality.
rate datawere either independent series ormoney was
endogenous with respect tointerestrates. Whenthese
subperiods are excluded from the sample, the short-
term nominal interest rate is observed to adjust com-
pletely toachange in the monetarygrowth rate with a
lag of 12 months.
The monthly data for the most recentperiod reveal a
statistically significant but economically anemicliquid-
ity effect that dissipates rapidly. This was to be ex-
pected, given efficient financial and capital markets.
On the other hand, the results concerning the Fisher
effect are fairly strong. They suggest that an increase
(decrease) inthe monetary growthrate that persists for
more than one month will result in an increase (de-
crease) in interest rates, other things constant. As a
change in the monetary growth rate comes to be re-
garded aspermanent, short-term rates willfullyadjust
within 12 months, The direction and magnitude ofthe
change in short-term rates will mirror the change in
monetary growth.
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